SECURITIZATION OF KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

Kurdish question has been one of the premier sources of the political instability and violence in Turkey for last decades. Besides Kurdish question has multidimensional character in regards of Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, membership of NATO and traditional relationship with USA. So, accumulating empirical evidence suggests that Kurdish question is a crux in many problems both in Turkey and region. Main sources of the Kurdish question are hidden in the transformation of Turkey from multinational imperial character to the nation states. Therefore autonomy and identity related demands have been perceived as a threat for national integrity and the extraordinary measures has been taken via securitization. Hence solving of the problem also depends on the proactive behavior of Turkey and taking initiative to reduce problem from securitization to the normal political sphere. This paper analyzes securitization process of Kurdish problem in Turkey by descriptive analysis methods.

Key Words: Kurds, Kurdish Question and Securitization.

1. Introduction and Method

Kurdish question has been one of the sources of political instability and violence in Turkey and North Middle East region. The Kurds have been a prominent ethnic group in the Middle East for almost two millennia and they had spread into Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and smaller amount in Caucasus. Kurds have been part of empires and state serving as loyal, sometime rebellious subjects in the region (Barkey, 2009:4). Once more Kurds are playing central role to the reconstruction of the north Middle East region since 1991 Gulf Operation.

Crucial role of Kurds during the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been given the opportunity to have autonomy in Northern Iraq. Therefore Kurdish existence has been percept as the national security issue by other states such as Iran, Syria and Turkey in the region. In naturally, all these countries are against to the autonomy of Kurds in Northern Iraq for protecting of their national integrity. In this context, each country has problematized Kurds in different level.

The problem of Kurds in Turkey as well as the Kurdish question of Turkey also has different context and trend. Turks tries to protect national integrity, Kurds tries to have more privilege. Additionally, the Kurdish question has exceeded to the beyond of local border and has become multidimensional, due to Turkey’s European Union accession and international collaborations. In these frame, many psychological barriers and legal restrictions complicate the solution for the problem.

Most important part of the problem is the securitization of ethnic existence of Kurds and their demands. Despite ethnic diversity has not been perceived as a threat in the political consciousness of Turks historically, the securitization of the Kurd ethnicity is related with the new nationalist political culture of Turkey. It means that some policies implemented to strengthen the fabric of the nation’s State and to improve national conciseness in early period of Republic of Turkey which led to the suppression of Kurds identity. So, this paper seeks to examine and clarify the historical and political process of securitization of Kurdish Question by constructivist criticism.

2. Securitization Theory

Securitization theory is a constructivist answer of the deepening and broadening exertion of the security studies in Copenhagen School after the Cold War time.

Actually classical threat perception and traditional security studies are insufficient to meet the post Cold War requirements (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:187). Therefore, many academicians...
argue that strategic security approaches and classical threat perception have been weakened because of the post Cold War conditions and globalization (Miller,2010:639; Bilgin,2010:619; Ripsman and Paul,2005:199; Beeson and Bellamy,2003:341; Newman,2001:240 etc.). So, states forced to realign their national security perception, policies and establishment to meet new challenges even in stable region. 

Most salient future of security threats in globalised world is that a shift in the nature of wars from Clausewitzian interstate wars to “wars of a third kind” civil ethnic wars and wars between small states (Ripsman and Paul,2005:201). So, ethnic and identity problems and solutions are very important issue for national states. These new security challenges also required the individual and societal security to be at the center of the national security policies. This requirement first appears in the list of the threats to human security in United Nation (UN)'s Human Development Report (HDR) in 1994 than in the Sectorial Security approaches of the Copenhagen School. UN approaches summarized in seven main categories; Economic security, food security, healthy security, environmental security, personal security, Community security and political security (“UNDP”,1994:24). But Copenhagen School summarized it in five categories which is called as security sectors; Military security, Environmental security, Economic security, Societal security, Political security (Buzan and Hansen,2009:212).

But this perception was criticized because of its focus on the state as the referent object for the security studies preferring instead a focused on individual (Booth,2005:33).

Ken Booth (2005:33) prefers to place human emancipation at the center of security studies in place of the state to meet new requirement of the new era. But he was also criticized by Martin Shaw for this focus on the individual, arguing instead that society is the missing dimension of security studies. For Shaw both state and individual need to be understood within sociological context and neither is seen as standing alone.

At the later stage Ole Waever has developed the notion of the Societal Security to understand condition of the post-Cold War Europe (Buzan and Hansen,2009:213). Societal security rendered the widening of perception of security and threats. Because, it has focused on identity as represent of the ability of a society to maintain its traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs (Booth,2005:34).

Another dynamic and influential contribution of Buzan, Waever and their collaborators to the security studies is Securitization theory. The meaning of securitization is that labeling something as a security issue imbues it with a sense of importance and urgency that legitimizes the use of special measures outside of political process to deal with it (Booth,2005:34).

Securitization theory also must be seen in the context of shifting agendas of security and as part of broader theoretical movement to study societal security according to the Williams (2003:513). In this theory, discursive act and speech act are accepting as driving factors. Actually speech act is another theory concerned with the ways in which language can be used. This theory originated with J.L. Austin but was developed by Searle. Speech act consisted of schematic plan which contained an action in the form of what the speaker wants to express in terms of their belief or wants (Smith, 1991:224). Copenhagen School has used speech act theory to provide an analytic framework their analyses. One clear example for conceptual framework in speech act is US-led “War on Terror” (McDonald, 2008:1). Both USA President and British Prime Minister’s used speech act to support military campaign against al-Qaeda instead of soft power. Similarly the antiterrorist prevention being introduced in many Western countries after the September 11 whose threats are to erode individual security in the name of protecting the state.

Securitization model is based on the constructivism in the International Relation. Constructivism has become an increasingly prominent theoretical approach to the International Relation discipline and drawing on insight from cognate disciplines such as sociology, constructivist argue that world is constituted socially through inter-subjective interaction. Besides, norm and identity are also central role to the constitution and dynamic of world politics (McDonald,2008:63-76).

Copenhagen School’s primary concern also with how security is constructed and work in world politics. Security cycle is crucial for foreign and domestic policy in securitization process. Main corners of these cycles are;

a) Securitizing actors (government, political elites, military, civil society).

b) Referent objects (states, groups, national sovereignty, ideology, economy etc.)
c) Existential threats for referent objects (sovereignty, integrity, fundamental right etc)

d) Extraordinary measures (How the question will be deal with)

The Copenhagen School rejects the perception of everything as a security problem. It means that any problem can be promoted from non-polarized to the politicized than securitization point at the end of the spectrum. So, threat perception and security policy depends on the securitizing object, referent object and perception of existential threats for referent object. In response to the existential nature of threat the securitizing actors assert that it has to adopt extraordinary means that go beyond the ordinary norms of the political domain. So securitization process is an extreme version of the politicizations according to the Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (Emmers, 2007: 109-125).

Desecuritization is a reverse process that the shifting of the issue out of emergency and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere (Emmers, 2007:111).

The Copenhagen school explains securitization process in two stages which perceived as essential threat to security. The first stage concerned about the portrayal of certain issue, persons or entities as existential threats to referent objects. The quality of securitizing is a specific rhetorical structure (Williams, 2003:514). This step can be started by state or other securitizing actors. Non state actors are also important player of the securitization model. For this stage existential threat must be salient and should have substantial political effect capacity. This is threat perception stage (Emmers, 2007:111).

At the second stage relevant audience (public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites) must be convinced by the securitizing actors about that emergency and extraordinary measures must be taken for existential threat by way of discourse act and speech act (Booth, 2005:34). This is persuasiveness stage. Claims about threat and priority has been made politically efficacious through the authoritative declaration of an existential threat (Williams, 2003:514).

The articulation of insecurity terms condition the audience and provides securitizing actors with the right to mobilize state power and move beyond traditional rules (Emmers, 2007:113). Government and political elites have advantage over the other actors for influencing audience. In democratic systems a government benefits from the legitimacy of having been elected by the electorate. Persuasiveness stage is more successful in autocratic, totalitarian and militaristic state. Because, authority uses every social tools to endorse its discourse. Waver also has concerns about the securitization results in a militarized and confrontational mind-set, which defines security question in an us-versus-them manner (Booth, 2005,34).

Securitization is a useful tool for analyzing domestic policies also. But it’s not used as criticism internally until September eleven attack. Besides, many Western countries have used securitization methods to pursue people about suspending and narrowing individual security after the September eleven. But the case of Turkey about Kurdish Question is different because securitization is related with ontological concern in nation state building process. Furthermore securitization process is more successful in authoritarian states instead of democratic ones. And authoritarian character and ontological concerns of fledgling Republic of Turkey has facilitated to securitization of Kurdish Question.

3. Securitization of Kurdish Question

Securitization theory has been emerged in the expansion of security concept in Copenhagen School. Societal Security came to mark out a third sector in this concept as a dynamic explanation of identity and migration problems of the Europe. Each sector has particular referent object and threat agenda. The concept of Social Security is presented to highlight the role of identity in security relations.

Normally all politic, economic or social problems should be solved with the context of political frame. Laws and legality cannot be suspended unless extraordinary situations emerging which state and society sees themselves under a treat. Securitization creates opportunity to use extraordinary measures for a problem beyond the normal political sphere. Therefore speech act is a crux in the securitization to validate extraordinary measures. Emmer (2010:141) says that “a successful act of securitization provides securitizing actors with the special right to use extraordinary measures.” Ken Booth criticizes securitization in this point. Because Booth says there wouldn’t be any threat outside of the discourse. Problems turn to a threat because states say like this (Booth, 2012:202).
In securitization of Kurdish Question case, the real problem shouldn’t be existence of Kurds. Because, Kurds live for hundreds of years in this region and they have spread over many countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria. But from the end of World War I onward, Kurdish identity came under severe pressure in all four states. Common points of these countries are they have turned into the nation states. So, Kurdish ethnicity and existence has been under the pressure of creating homogeneous nation state policy. This reality show itself in the securitization actors, referent object and extraordinary measures in securitization of Kurdish question.

3.1. Securitization Actors of Kurdish Question

Securitization flows from non-politicized ground to the politicized and securitized base. But an issue cannot automatically transform into a security question. Therefore question here that who or what the main determiner of the securitization process is? According to the theory, determiner of the securitization is called “securitizing actors” they may be governments, political elites, military and civic society. Main specification of the securitization actors;

a) They have the privilege to use state power.

b) They have affective control over the mass media and others tools in communication manners for convincing public about the existence of a threat and a requirement of extraordinary measures for overcoming it.

In this point securitization theory has been criticized by Booth (2007:202) because it’s just being speech act and by others because it’s sociologically untenable (McSweeney,1996: 82). So requirement of affective control over mass media is logical result of the importance of speech act in securitization process. Additionally, speech act is a kind of hinge for associating other elements of the securitization cycles. Because securitizing actors constitute a relationship between referent object and perceived threats through act of speech. So the reality of the perceived threats must be interrogated in any case of analyzing of securitization too.

In Kurdish case, the securitization actors are both Turkish government and Turkish army. Of course Turkish army has direct effect or stand of control on the politic for many years (Birdisli,2013:223). But actually neither politicians nor military is homogenous in Turkish politics. These institutions have always contained liberals and nationalist elites. It means that Liberals one respect to the moral values and pluralism while nationalist ones believe in centralization and homogeneity. So, these nationalist elites are called as states elite in this paper. Liberal elites who are called as democrats themselves have been always in favor of democratic rights and subsidiarity according to the imperial heritage and Islamic doctrine. But state elites have been so rigid about minority rights in the name of homogeneity of State. Unfortunately State elites (hawks) have been dominance on the State of mind even if they are not in power from beginning of the foundation of modern Turkey. Actually State elites newer been in power after the 1950s but they have sustainable effectiveness on Turkish policy by using of gravity of the military on society. Since the time of drafting of early Republicans principles the state elites had always felt that they had the last words on vital matters (Kadioglu,1998:189). So, Turkish army staged coup in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and reorganized and reinstituting political arena in each time.

State elites have power to control on mass media. Mass media also has been one of the important power centers outside the Turkish cabinet and parliament in Turkish Society with states and military elites (Arslan,2005:141). So, they have always affected cohesion on social and political decision.

Each of the coup d’etats in 1960, 1971 and 1980 has been followed by a period of military rule, and caused significant repercussions for media freedom. First Turkish Broadcasting Corporation (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu-TRT) was established in 1964 after the Coup of 1960 which brought down Democrat Party. (Elmas and Kurban,2011:21)

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1 Islamic doctrine is opposed to ethnic nationalism and segregation because of the universal character. In Quran verses 49:13 “O mankind! We have indeed created you from one man and one woman, and have made you into various nations and tribes so that you may know one another; indeed the more honorable among you, in the sight of Allah, is one who is more pious among you; indeed Allah is All Knowing, All Aware. (Piety is the basis of honour in Allah’s sight.)” and phrase of Prophet Mohammad about nationalism is “He is not one of us who calls for asabiyyah, (tribalism/nationalism) or who fights for asabiyyah, or who dies for asabiyyah.” [Abu Dawud]
Military regimes established after each coup d’état also sought to seize the entire media establishment. The coup of September 12th, 1980, Turkey’s third, was the first time that a military intervention was announced to the public via television.

It also marks the beginning of the structural transformation of the political and social life in the country that stretches to the present day. The media especially TV has been the most important tool to affect public opinion. In 1983, the Communications High Council (Haberleşme Yüksek Kurulu-HYK), a hybrid civilian and military body, was established to oversee the communication policies of the government (Elmas and Kurban, 2011:22). So, state and military elites have had power on the mass media and communications for pursuing citizens about requirements of extraordinary power for overcoming perceived threats.

3.2 Referent Objects and Existential Threats in the Kurdish Case

The referent object is an object or value that is thought to be under the threat. So it may be states, groups, national sovereignty, ideology or economy etc. In Kurdish case the referent object is the state and an existential threat for referent object is national integrity of state. Statement and elites refer to the integrity and unity of Turkey each time in the phrase of the “One state one nation”. In this point main theme of speech act has been threat of disintegration.

This fear has been reflected on the act and oration of the political and military leaders. Main approach was the one state and one nation. For example Minister of Education and Chair of the Turkish Association (Türk Ocağı) H. Suphi Tanrıöver declared that “Everyone who are Muslims and Turkish speaking and who are in love of Turkish are called Turks. We care that unity of the language, religion and desire” during the teachers college conferences around 1929 (Tanrıöver, 1929:194). And Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü also says “Our principle is to convert everybody to the Turk in our land. Our goal is to extirpate those who opposed to the Turkishness from our land” (Bali, 2001:106).

This discourse has been reflected on the some academic works. Scientifically controversial “Turkish History Thesis” and “The Sun Language Thesis” are productions of exclusive perception.2

Yayman who categorizes official reports about Kurds calls the period as refusing and assimilation between 1925 and 1950 (Yayman, 2011:34).

Hawk politicians’ advice to take some extraordinary measures such as using of hard power, displacement and assimilation in context of securitization. Booth has criticized securitization because of the speech act and it has been stated that reality of context of speech act should be interrogated at the beginning of this essay. So the question is reality of perceived threat to the referent object. Of course Kurdish population is one of the main branches of Turkey nations. As an ethno-national community Kurdish population spread into territorial area of mostly Mesopotamia and Anatoly and a smaller amount Cacasos (Armenia, Georgia). The size of the Kurdish population in Turkey is rather controversial because of the lack of consensus data since 1965 (Sırkeci, 2000:154).

But it can be said that Kurdish population in Turkey has varied from 7 percent to 13 -15 percent with regards to different sources since 1948 (Mutlu, 1996:520). Actually the size of Kurds in general population is not clear because census data doesn’t include information about mother language or identity. Additionally official taboo about ethnicity hinder to having reliable data about ethnic structure of the Turkey from beginning of Republic. Although some questions about ethnicity has been include in census since of 1965 and this information was not shared with the public because of the “secret” classification (Sırkeci, 2000:152). Even if this information has been issued it would be controversial because of the reliability of answers.

The Kurds are one of the oldest people of the Middle East and The Kurdish language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family. They are generally classified as Northwestern Iranian languages, or intermediate between Northwestern and Southwestern Iranian (Windürf, 2012). Anatolia has many ethnic languages but officials’ language is only Turkish and there are no sufficient academic works about ethnic languages because of the conservative nationalist policies (Türkdoğan, 2010:148-149).

have imprinted itself on modern Turkey. During that decade, which witnessed the rise of nationalism in the European continent but especially western Europe, the idea that the Turks were a glorious nation rose to prominence in Turkey. “Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language theory emerged in a series of official conference and publications, emphasizing the role of race in definition nation” (Cagaptay, 2004:86)

2 “Turkish nationalism in the 1930s is an important episode in Turkish history whose legacy seems to...
According to the 1948 CIA report Kurds have a long history of rebellion, although they have never been united under a government of their own and even now have only a rudimentary nationalist movement. So they have always been perceived as potential threat for internal stability even in Iran, Iraq, and Syria (CIA,2013).

There have been on average 29 Kurdish uprisings (according to some the last one is PKK terror) between 1806 and 1984 in Turkey (Yayman, 2011:53). But at the Ottoman times, the Kurds’ primary concern in the waning days of Empire was how to avoid from taxmen and conscriptions. But after that Kurds have hoped to have sovereignty at the end of the First World War according to the Wilsons’ principles. But this hopes evaporated quickly by unimplemented Sevres Treaty. Ironically, the Kurds has responded enthusiastically to Mustafa Kemal’s appeal to their piety to defeat infidels who had tried to finish off the Ottoman Empire. They were soon disappointed more by the new secular and ethnic distinctive regime (Barkey, 2009:6). So, first challenge of the Kurds to the secular and nationalist regime was Sheikh Said revolt in 1925 after the declaration of extinction of caliphates. Some works claim that this revolt was related with the promise of autonomy which had been given by M. Kemal Pasha. Yayman (2011:34) advocates that M. Kemal mentions about this in the speech of Izmit on 16 Jan 1923 before declaration of Republic on 29 October 1923 but he broke his promises. As a result it can be said that first Kurdish revolt in Republic was related with broken promises and secular policies of government. But actually, demands for independence by Kurds were blurred until 1987 when emergence of the activity of separatist terror organization of PKK was at stake.

So reality dimension of “threat of disintegration” which is core for speech of act in securitization of Kurdish question is not clear until 1970’s. Hence Yayman calls this period as a “The period of vagueness” (Yayman,2011:34). Therefore Turkish government and officials has aimed to create nation state and tried to have homogeneous citizen in the name of unity. So founder of new secular and nation state Republic has perceived threat from not only ethnic minorities but also conservative Muslim citizens also. Hence speech of act is depends on the fictional and perceptual threat rather than real treats until 1970s and the public opinion does not share same feeling about disintegration threat with political elites.

Yayman (2011:39) says new perspective of Turkey has ignited ethnic reaction especially among Kurds. Some academic works which have been motivated officially such as “Turkish History Thesis” and “The Sun Language thesis” were very exclusionary and provocative.

Kurdish question has introduced a new stage after 1970s because of the effect of spreading of the Marxist ideas especially among university students. A Marxist-Leninist organization has been set up among Kurds youth by Abdullah Öcalan which is called as PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party) in 1978. 1980 military coup has had transformative effect on this organization. Military elites have suspended the constitution, all political activities have been banned and many activists from both left and right have been sent to the jail. One of the arrested men was members of the Revolutionary Youth (DEV-GENÇ).

DEV-GENÇ is a socialist and revolutionary organization and Abdullah Öcalan led a small group of radicals in this organization. Öcalan and some of his friends has run away to Syria after the coup and reorganized PKK. PPK has started to attack some target in Turkey in 1987.

This new organization has begun to attack to the security forces and civic targets for the sake of independence of Kurdish state. An increased terrorist incident has resulted in the public support for using military measures.

Actually "persuasiveness stage" has worked two sided. Turkish hawks has used to pursue public awareness and support for necessity of extraordinary measure while PKK terrorist have tried to pursue to get support from Kurdish people for their ideal. For this purpose most terrorist attacks have concentrated on the Kurdish populated areas to force them (See Table 1). Actually, many Kurds have not supported the independence idea despite being uncomfortable due to ethnic discrimination.
Position of Kurd intellectuals was also not clear. They had been in three parts. Leftist ones support PKK activities while conservative ones against it. Big gap has been occupied by silent majority (Vali, 2011).

Terror, uncertainty about the solution of the problem and hard measures paved the way of the rising tension between Turks and Kurds after the 1987. But despite this chaos, there has never been any internal conflict between Turks and Kurds.

### 3.3. Extraordinary Measures for Kurdish Question

Extraordinary measures are the last ring of the chain of securitization. It means using preventing methods for threats out of the ordinary political measures. So using of hard power in inner politics on behalf of the legitimacy of speech act is most salient future of this stage. So, extraordinary measures should be related with the perceived threat by securitizing actors. Therefore every extraordinary measure should be associated with a sparker. In Kurdish question case, prominent sparker for using extraordinary measures has been local Kurdish uprisings and related official reports. Approximately fifteen official reports have been drafted between 1925 and 1960 (Yayman, 2011). These reports reflect anxiety of Turkish officials about geographic integrity of state. But, nevertheless Yayman (2011:34) classifies these reports into two groups; “civic perspective” and “security perspective”.

Civic perspective reflects liberalist and democratic approaches. Those believe that the problem is related with the economic development and they have offered economic, societal and cultural prevention policies in Kurd populated area in their reports.

Those who have security perspective believed that the Kurdish question is challenge to the nation state authority so this problem must be deal with military measures. Unfortunately security perspective has suppressed democratic approaches and caused to militarization and confrontational mind-set about Kurdish question.

Therefore extraordinary measures in Kurdish question case are:

- a) Suppressing of any challenge for state authority by using military power
- b) Exile of tribal chiefs, sheikhs and leading families from their lands to the other regions
- c) Change of demography by migration and resettlement
- d) Assimilation of Kurd consciousness by nationalist education formation

#### 3.3.1. Using of Military Measures

Military power has been used for Sheikh Said Uprising (1925) and in Dersim (1937). Both of them were suppressed by military measures and supported with Law of Treason (Hıyanet-i Vataniye...
Kanunu) which was acted firstly in 1920 and had been amended by adding new article in 25 Feb. 1925 after Sheikh Said uprising. Besides, “The Law of the Ensuring Tranquility” which gives extraordinary power to the government had been enacted in 4 March 1925. Democrat Prime Minister Ali Fethi Bey had forced to resign from government and retired General İsmet İnönü has been appointed by President M. Kemal Atatürk during these events (Koç, 2013:165).

Dersim uprising has differed from the religion oriented Sheikh Said uprising with its nationalist character. That maybe, Dersim rebellions have demanded more autonomy for eastern part of the Anatoly (Akgül, 2014:19). Additionally Dersim Kurds differ from Sheikh Said followers by being Alewite sect of Islam. Sheikh Said Uprising was a religious reaction firstly to the new secular reforms of the government (Nur, 2007:84; Kinross, 2004:465). But both incidents had been confronted with a hard respond.

Approximately forty-seven prominent people had been sentenced to death and hang with Sheikh Said after the suppression. For most of the time, Dersim uprising is considered as the biggest rebellion in the history of Turkish Republic. Approximately 13,160 people were killed against 110 soldier in 1938 (Kürkçügil, 2009:59).

Military measures continued after 1987 when the PKK has begun the terrorist action until 2012. But this time hot battle was with only members of PKK. Usually Kurdish people have been affected indirectly. Many times Kurdish people who live in the rural area were caught between two fires because of the militant and logistic sources of the PKK were Kurdish people.

In some cases, the PKK issued a military service law in 1990 by which every Kurdish youth aged 18 to 25 without exception was obliged to join the PKK army. Compulsory recruitment was later ended as due to sufficient voluntary recruitment. From 1994, it appears that the PKK began systematically and increasingly child recruitment and children's regiments were even created. About 22,849 terrorist were seized as dead by state between 1984 and 2012 in twenty-nine years military fight against PKK against 11,785 military lost (martyr) according to the Turkish Parliamentary Inquiry Commission of Human Rights Report about Violation of the Right of Life (“Turkish Parliamentary Report, 2013”)

Graphic 1. Number of PKK Terrorist that is Seized Death in Military Operations Between 1984 and 2012


Those total numbers are very informative to understand military prevention is not a solution for securitized ethnic problems. Because human loss of the Turkish state is more than the loss of the independence war (around 10.885 people had loss their life). Additionally within the PKK also outside execution have increased losses of Kurdish people even more.

3.3.2. Change of Demography
Another extraordinary measure in Kurdish question is the exile of the prominent people of Kurdish folk after the uprisings. For example many sheikhs and tribal chief has been exiled from Eastern Anatoly after the religious oriented Sheikh Said uprising. Around 7-12 thousand people had been relocated after the Dersim operation according to the official reports. Exile and resettlement policy was not related only to Kurdish revolts. Kurds have been unchanged actors of the exile and resettlement almost after the each military coup. For example 484 Kurds arrested and 55 aghas exiled to the western province after the 1960 military coups (Barkey and Fuller, 1998:29). Many Kurdish writers, poets and politicians were forced to flee from Turkey to the Europe after the 1980 military coup. Actually these events were significantly affected the fate of the Kurdish question. Because PKK has had the chance to spread of its activities through the country by way of Kurds in Western region of Turkey and besides the Kurdish question has been internationalized also because of large numbers of Kurds have had migrated to the Europe (Barkey and Fuller, 1998:11).

3.3.3. Political Restrictions
Another extraordinary measure for Kurdish question was the political restrictions. Approximately 58 political parties had been banned between 1924 and 2009 by Constitutional Courts in Turkish political life and eight of them were related with directly Kurdish problem.

First political party which was related with Kurdish problem was Peoples Labor Party (Halkin Emek Partisi -HEP). The founder of HEP was a member of Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and parliamentarian of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. These parliamentarians had been expelled from party because of attendance to Kurds Conference which was held in Paris in 1989. Than these parliamentarians resigned before final decision of party disciplinary committee and founded HEP in 1990.

But this party had been banned by claim of “seeking to destroy national and territorial integrity of Turkey” by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1993. The Court, observes that the HEP's political message amounted to claims that “citizens of Kurdish origin were not free to use their own language and were unable to make political
demands based on the principle of self-determination, and the security forces campaigning against pro-Kurdish terrorist organizations were committing illegal acts and were responsible in part for the suffering of Kurdish citizens in certain parts of Turkey” (“Turkish Constitutional Court Decision”,1993). The other parties also have been banned with similar indictments (See Table 2).

Table 2. Banned Kurdish Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Founding in</th>
<th>Banned in</th>
<th>ideology</th>
<th>Political Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEP People’s Labor Party</td>
<td>7 Jun 1990</td>
<td>14 July 1993</td>
<td>Kurdish nationalist</td>
<td>Center left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZDEP Freedom and Democracy Party</td>
<td>19 Oct 1992</td>
<td>23 Nov 1993</td>
<td>Kurdish nationalist</td>
<td>Center left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP Democrat Party</td>
<td>21 Jun 1991</td>
<td>16 Jun 1994</td>
<td>Kurdish nationalist</td>
<td>Center left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADEP People’s Democracy Party</td>
<td>11 May 1994</td>
<td>13 Mar.2003</td>
<td>Kurdish nationalist</td>
<td>Center left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEHAP Democratic People’s Party</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Kurdish nationalist</td>
<td>Extreme left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP Democratic Society Party</td>
<td>9 Nov 2005</td>
<td>11 Dec 2009</td>
<td>Kurdish nationalist</td>
<td>Center left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political parties which are attributed to Kurds usually function in the municipalities at the eastern parts of Turkey. Because, national popularity and support is very low under the shadow of accusation of becoming separatist and supporting terrorism (PKK). Rate of the total vote of Kurdish parties in general election is around 4 percent and 6.6 percent. Nevertheless numerous Kurdish deputies and administrators are attacked, murdered by unknown assailants and sued by the Turkish courts and sent to jails (Öztürk,2013:37). Some Kurdish politicians and activists do not hesitate to present their sympathy to the PKK. For example, Osman Baydemir who is Mayor of Diyarbakir has condolence visit to the murdered PKK members in Diyarbakır (Yavuz,2011). Selahattin Demirtaş and Ahmet Türk whose Co-chair of Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and Gülten Kışanak who is parliamentarian in Turkish National Parliament (TBMM) are declared that “PKK is not terrorist organization” in a panel which was held in Brookings Institute (Taspinar, 2012). However last Turkish Party, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has 26 deputies in parliament already (“Distribution of seats”,2014).

And Turkey’s major parties have carefully acting about this issue despite of the functioning democratic order. But Islamist and Kurdish parties have contributed to the dispute on this issue on the more democratic ground gradually.

3.3.4. Assimilation of Kurd Consciousness by Nationalist Education Formation

Nationalist education formation is one of the extraordinary measures in securitization of Kurdish question. This process has begun with the integration policy not assimilation. But some international and domestic conjuncture caused extreme praxis and assimilation. International conjuncture was rising of fascism in Europe around 1930s and 1940s (Bakan and Birdişli,2010,62). Turkey also has effected from this authoritarian nationalism. Domestic conjuncture was ideology quest for fledged State.

Turkey’s states elites have a new vision about future of State after the Independence War to carry her to among of contemporary civilizations. This vision includes western style nation-state and republic. (Kinros,2004:445). Hence education and language reforms have been used for reshape new nation.

The term of the “nation” has been described with the reference to the common culture at the beginning. Turkish nationality perceived as a product of common culture which in turn had developed as a consequence of people of different ethnic background and religious faith living close proximity for long period of time. This perception constitute historical affinity, common morality, loyalty to a common political entity, a common
homeland, common roots and descent and a common language (İnan, 1969:369). So Turks and Kurds have been accepted as a one part of the nation by way of the populations of both is taken into account as one element (Mears, 1924:35). Besides, there was a special interest in the ethnic Turk itself in these times. According to the founders of the Republic, it was now primarily the ethnic Turk who had to undertake the responsibility of enabling Turkey to 'catch up with the contemporary civilization and even try to surpass it'. Thus, it had become imperative to upgrade the Turk so that it could successfully fulfill this mission (Heper, 2007:85). Therefore history, language and culture of ethnic Turk were carefully studied. When approaching to the 1930s, the ultimate aim has been integration of all part of the nation in ethnic Turk for the defensive purpose according to the Heper (2007:86). In naturally, there was a pressure on the non-ethnic Turk to go through such a transformation not assimilation. Because of national transformation include secularism, this is also has created a pressure on the conservative Turks also.

National transformation has appeared in the field of language for the first time. Atatürk said that “The language is one of the essential features of a nation. A person who inspires to be [an integral] part of the Turkish nation should before everything else ... speak Turkish. ... Those who speak another language may collaborate with others and act against us”, in the city of Adana in southern Turkey on 13 February 1931 (Taspinar, 2005: 63).

So, the other ethnicities have been percept as the integral part of the nations and some transformative hypothesis, policies and institutions have been implemented to facilitate integration (Heper, 2007:86). The hypotheses were Turkish history thesis, Sun-Language Theory and Turanism. Institutions were Turkish Hearths (1931), Turkish Historical Society (1931) and Turkish Language Association (1932).

General policy of the States about Turkism reflects on the famous phrase of the Atatürk. He once declared “How happy is the one who says "I am Turkish". Atatürk used this phrase in his speech delivered for the 10th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, on October 29, 1933 (Republic Day) for the first time. And this phrase has been guiding principle of the Kemalist education system of the Republic of Turkey. Later, the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey introduced this phrase to the "Student Oath (Öğrenci Andı)” which all students must repeat the oath each day in 1972.

Another example is that The Minister of Education and Chair of the Turkish Association (Türk Ocagi) H. Suphi Tanrıöver (1929:194) declared that “Everyone who Muslims and Turkish speaking and who in love of Turkish are called Turks. We care that unity of the language, religion and desire” during the teachers college conferences. Besides, Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü also says “Our principle is converting everybody to the Turk in our land. Our goal is to expirart those who opposed to the Turkishness from our land.” (Bali, 2001,106).

In this context any geographic, social and ethnic explanation about Kurds couldn't find any place in educational materials.

4. Results and Discussion

Kurds are one of the oldest major ethnic groups in Middle East. They have been a part of the large countries and used to live together with other folks. Kurds have dispersed across four states Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey after the First World War. But their aspirations for autonomy have caused prolonged conflict with central authorities’ in each country for a long time. But Turkish side of the problem is differentiated from others because of the membership of Turkey to the NATO and candidacy for the EU. Therefore concerns about the stability of Turkey are extending beyond the national borders. Kurdish existence has been most spectacular political problem and national security issue of Turkey because of the bad handling. So approximately over the thirty years this problem has turned into a quagmire for Turkey. Main reason of this failure is securitization of the Kurdish existence instead of solving this in a political sphere. Here the question is what is the reason of Kurdish question in Republic of Turkey are while regional and cultural rights had been assumed in Ottoman State.

Securitization of Kurd existence is related to the changes in the political culture in Turkey. Political culture is expression for a mindset which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems and solution which are logically possible according to the Elkins and Simeon (1979:127-128). Turkey’s political culture has changed from empire culture which was pluralistic, mosaic-like ethnic and religious population to the nation state culture which is more static and homogeneous after the

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4 Turkish Hearths was founded in 1912 but it’s become most common and stronger NGO around 1930s.
It’s understood from these historical context that the referent object was national integrity in securitization of Kurdish question. So, the Turkish government has tried to eliminate possible negative results for its integrity by suppressing of cultural and political demands of Kurds.

But extraordinary measures such as military pressure, resettlement in Western region and exiles have been caused to metastasis of Kurdish question. Because pressures let to rising extremism between Kurds and resettlement policy also has caused spread of the problem to the other regions of Turkey. Therefore PKK was able to take action in some big cities by its supporters.

Some researches present that PKK was able to hold some passive propaganda methods such as demonstration, press statements at 68% of Turkey in 2010 (Beren, 2012: 102). These illegal actions give impression to the people that they are not safe and cause public support to the extraordinary measures. This situation feed also voidable circles in securitization of Kurdish question. In this point the question is that reality of the threat. The criticism of the Keen Booth about speech act in the securitization is whether right or not can be questioned at this point.

In Kurdish case existential threats for reference object was disintegration. The original PKK goal was an independent state for all the Kurds divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria at the beginning. It was planned to achieve by force. But later it was given up at least in Turkey because of the irredentist movement rare (Somer,2004:252). So PKK officials decide to demand democratic autonomy instead of force. But extraordinary measures such as military pressure, resettlement in Western region and exiles have been caused to metastasis of Kurdish question. But extraordinary measures such as military pressure, resettlement in Western region and exiles have been caused to metastasis of Kurdish question. Therefore PKK was able to take action in some big cities by its supporters.

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